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a hypothesis succeeds,

it

aspect of absolute truth

men

;

?

SISSON
tends gradually to take on the

forget that

it

is

a hypothesis at

This is
all and proceed as if it were a proven item of knowledge.
what has happened widely in the case of the mechanistic-deterministic theory of the universe.

This hypothesis

may

well be con-

movement in the whole history of
principle of modern science, and the

sidered the most successful single

thinking:

it

the central

is

science which has been built

of the present age.

mastered the minds of

upon

in the realm of the intellect.

become almost a

it is

lord of the thought

Xo wonder that the hypothesis
men and become the very image of
To

question

sign of mental weakness,

its

and action
itself

has

the divine

ultimate validity has

upon which the seeming-

superior intelligence of the mechanist looks

down with

pity or con-

embodied in the designation of man
himself as a mechanism from La Mettrie's "L'Homme machine"
to the present day, this doctrine has grown and spread until it pervades not only biology and ps\chology, but also sociology (in the
broadest sense) and ethics.
It should be clear that the supreme duty of the philosopher is to
question this sweeping conclusion. Never was Socratic scepticism
more demanded by the situation. All the forces of intellectual
fashion and etiquette,
as powerful in the life of reflective
thought as elsewhere, are on the side of the mechanistic interpretation.
IF the final metaphysical dictvim of mechanism is not true,
then the present state of opinion concerning man and the miiverse
is the supreme example in history of the facilis descensus Averni;
its consequences might well be as terrible as Romanes apprehended
them fifty years ago when he wrote
"Never in the history of man has so terrific a calamity befallen the race as that which all who look may now behold
tempt.

Its

final

triumph
:

—
—

is
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?

advancing as a deluge, black with destruction, resistless
in might, uprooting our most cherished hopes, engulphing
our most precious creed, and burying our highest life in
mindless destruction."^
first proposition is that the metaphysical theory of mechan-

My own

unproven, and that philosophy has no more urgent duty
than to push to the furthest limits a criticism of the grounds of the
theory. This is a logical undertaking of the first order, as we shall

ism

is

totally

see at the outset of the inquiry itself.

Nothing could be more unwise and impractical than
estimate or in any

way

The

first

to

under-

depreciate the truth involved in the mechan-

and the primary qualification, of
mechanism is to be possessed of a
reasonable comprehension of the gigantic success and validity of
scientific mechanism, warm and a sincere appreciation of its beneInestimable damage has been wrought to the
ficient achievements.
istic

theory.

obligation,

the opponent of metaphysical

cause of a non-mechanistic view of the universe by quasi-religious

and admirable achievements of
need no extended treatment the anti-evolution movement is perhaps the best example. But
it is so far out on the obscurantist wing as to be of little service in
orientation for us.
Any sincere and hopeful attack upon metaphysical mechanism must put a whole world between its view of
science and that of the typical anti-evolutionists.
More to us is the case of highly intelligent and critical minds
oppressed by the same type of fears as Romanes, who have lamented
rather than challenged the ravages of mechanism and have been led
by their grief into false views of the beneficient results of mchanistic
science. Of this type Krutsch's "Modern Temper" is a notable and
which blindly attack the

pleas

science

:

solid

this is too familiar a spectacle as to

;

brilliant

We

example.

cannot believe that lyric utterances of

this

nature can avail anything in the needed inquiry.
1.

We

must

Terms and Concepts Involved

first invite

the mechanist to join in a careful, logical

scrutiny of the terms and concepts involved in the problem.

These
main two: machine and mechanism. Behind these English words are of course two classic terms, Greek mechane and
Latin machina; the Latin machina we may pass over as practically
equivalent to English machine.
But the Greek mechane, the oldest
are in the

1

Candid Examination of Theism, 1787, p. 51. Also quoted
Science^ Cambridge University Press, 1909 p. 486.

Modern

;

in

Danvin and
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of the

set, carries,

as

we might

expect, a deeply different sense, at

from our English derivatives, not only machine, but also
mechanism and mechanical, etc. That is, mechane signifies any
means or device by which a desired end can be achieved it is hardly
more than a way or manner of doing something. Thus it has a
breadth and looseness of application far different from the hard and
fast limitation of the English terms machine and, in its primary
last

;

sense,

This

mechanism.

is

of vital importance in understanding the

The common

idea in mechane
But the purpose, of course,
in the maker
it
is
is
not in the mechane or the machine
and user of these things. So that while mechane and machine both
imply purpose, it is not their own purpose, but the purpose of the
No purpose, no
That they both connote, inexorably.
maker.
mechane, no machine. Both are devised to achieve and end; and
such devising takes place only in what we call minds to talk of
devising means to end and in the same breath to deny mind is to
This is a logical crux and the discussion must hold
talk nonsense.

processes of thought in this

and machine

is

that

of

field.

purpose.

:

;

useless for us to talk with each other unless we are
mean something by our words, and to keep on meaning
the same until we give fair warning of change. There are too many
Humpty-Dumpty's to whom "a word means just what I want it to
mean, no more and no less." When we say mechane, with Greeks,
Note
or machine with our own speech, we must mean purpose.
implies
purEnglish
word
mechanism
that
the
that I have not said
the
operating
term
describe
to
pose. The biologist has borrowed the
to

it.

It

is

willing to

structures of living beings, especially skeletal and muscular struc-

and other movements. Biological discussion had
have a term for these structures, and it got its term in the commonest way, by adapting from the Greek. But between the time
when the Greeks were still using mechane in their own sense and the
time when the biologist adopted, and adapted, the term to his use,
tures for locomotion
to

—

—

machine had swum into the region of reflective thought, and the
term mechanism was all infected with a non- Greek conception of
machine.
So biological "mechanism," which would have been a
simple and innocent word to the Greeks from whom the form was
borrowed, now carries a sense of machinery, of cog wheels, crankshafts, pinions, steel, iron, brass, and so on ad lib., a hard, "mechanical" feeling, quite remote from and hostile to thought and purpose.
the

—
IS

Nothing of

this sort
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the rather genial and free
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by a Greek accustomed

to

word mechane.

Thus we come by a perfectly proper linguistic process to possess
word iiiechainsDi, with the usual set of derivatives, which is
sharply different in meaning from its original, and also from the

—

—

the

Latin parallel term machina; in that these terms both imply purpose
in the

maker of

and the new English term explicitly does
and indeed, as time
be hostile to purpose. Yet at the same time all

deviser,

not imply purpose,

goes on, tends to

is

indifferent to purpose,

new "mechane"" terms

these

still

bear the fragrance of the old

Greek uicchanc, and can avail themselves at need of the breadth and
freedom of that old term. Such is the subtlety and elusiveness of
language and no inquiry into processes of thought can evade or
safely deny these elusive aspects of the meanings of terms, for they
This is
presently turn out to have rigidly logical consequences.
eminently true in the present great debate on the mechanistic interpretation of the world and Man.
We repeat then, that the common idea of mechane and machine
and that the modern terms
is purpose in the mind of a maker
mechanical, meachanism, mechanistic, etc., have sloughed off this
idea of purpose, and retained simply an idea of operativeness or
:

;

now

Let us

efficacy.

meanings

:

that

is

take the next step in this simple logic of

to see that

which concerns us materially
or device,

machine

if

;

:

whereas mechane

is

any sort of means

only adapted to the end and adopted for the end,

strictly

means something put together of parts. This is
Greek original probably not of the Latin

certainly not true of the

form

Greek mechane and English machine

sharply in an important aspect of their meaning, and one

differ

indeed,

it

is

;

quite possible that in earlier English use the

word machine might sometimes mean something quite
what we call a tool, for example. But in modern use

simple,

the term
machine rigorously implies complexity, and complexity due to the
conjoining of parts, and of parts which work together to accomplish

the desired end.
2.

Man-made Machines and Natural Mechanisms.

—

The modern world is chock full of machines in this sense, all
way from an egg-beater to a Hoe cylinder press, a Wright
whirlwind engine, or a radio-compass. Whoever says machine or
mechanical today is talking about all these things he may not mean
the

:

;
:
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them directly, but when his word strikes the ear-drum of his hstener
and reverberates in his association areas, the dim form of all these
steel and brass contraptions loom in the fringe of his consciousness
certainly they are operative in his "thinking," or else all modern
psychology is mad. And a logic which ignores psychology is no
logic at all, but only pompous Humpty-Dumptyism. When I use a
word it means what my hearer thinks in response to it, no more
and no less and if I say machine or mechanical to a twentieth
century civilized man, these words inevitably make him think of
Ford cars, typewriters, diamond drills, oil derricks, and so on ad
libitum. This is part of the rigorous logic of machine and mechan:

and must be recognized by those who use the terms.
It is clear that this put-togetherness of the machine brings in
the maker and his purpose in full strength the machine does not
put itself together: on the contrary the leading business of civilized
man today is making parts of machines and "assembling" them into
machines. Ford himself is the mighty Maker of all the millions of
cars that bear his magic name under him swarms a vast hierarch\'
of lesser makers, some with much mind, whom we call engineers,
some with less mind, called mechanics, and others who need no mind,
And as is Ford so are the AIcbut only bodies, called laborers.
Cormicks, the Edisons, and the other great ]\Iachine-]\Iakers. At
the other end, as soon as the Makers have perfected their task and
the machines stand ready in serried rowed (or any other convenient
array!), the millions of users seize them and rush about in the maniical,

:

;

made possible by these modern miracles. Such is the
Modern Machine Age, and poor is the intelligence that does not
sense it in some degree and it is this Age whose ghost is raised

fold activities

:

whenever the words machine and mechanical are offered and
cepted in intellectual

But
itself
is

in all this

is

maze of purpose and achievement,

purposeless

ac-

traffic.

it

:

neither thinks nor feels

;

the machine

the machine age

the fruit of infinite purpose and intelligence, in a double sense

first it is

purpose and intelligence that generate the machines, and

then the machines open the

way

for the further expansion of pur-

pose and intelligence.

But the machine

without intelligence

much

naturally

;

so

become the terms

is

without purpose and

so that machine-like or mechanical

to denote activity

suggest purpose and Intelligence, but in

itself

complex enough to
That

devoid of both.

;

IS

is
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the sting of a philosophical mechanism, that

man

does not always assert, that

part and parcel of a mechanistic universe,

or at best that his supposed purpose
lacking

force and validity,

all

it

implies even

himself, being a

— an

is

is

illusion

if

it

mechanism and

also devoid of purpose

but an epiphenomenon
stretching like an im-

material veil over the hard realities of the cosmic machine.

now

which issues from the two sharply
on the one hand we have the
simple machine with which any child is more or less familiar, made
by man, used by man for man's purposes. Never before has this
fact bulked so large as now as already pointed out, it has given our
age its most fitting name and is its most conspicuous feature. On
the other hand, we have the scientific concept of the whole material
universe as mechanism also. Electrons and atoms and molecules,
cells, tissues and organs, organisms themselves, all are studied according to mechanistic concepts and looked upon as mechanistic
]\Iark

the confusion

divers denotations of these terms

:

:

operations.

case we know the history of the machines from the
and know that they emerge in response to our purposes
and by virtue of our intelligence. In the second case we find the
mechanisms, or at least what we call mechanisms, in action; of their

In the

very

first

start,

we know

origins

Out of

nothing.

this

ignorance perhaps as

much

from any other source has arisen the concept of God, at least so
far as the intellect is concerned the "argument from design" is still

as

;

the best of the logical "proofs" of the existence of a Divine Being.

So

far as

cerned,

Homo

it

is

Faber

The making

machines
is

in the

man

clear that

is

simple and original sense are conthe machinist and not the machine.

a better definition of the species

first

of tools and

now

now than

of machines

is

ever before.

perhaps the most

conspicuous expression and embodiment of man's purposive and
intelligent life.
The very purposelessness of the materials out of

which machines are made

offers the opportunity for the fullest plav

of the purposeiveness of man.

problem,

human

all

the logic tends

to

Certainly from this angle of the

make purpose

the essence of the

would be a strange perversion to argue
the blindness and subjection of the machine back upon the maker
factor involved

:

it

thereof.

Now
is

a

no one would be so quick as the mechanist to deny that man
machine made, as man's own machines are made, by a higher
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philosbeing for that higher being's purposes. Yet if a mechanistic
rehave
ophy is to rest upon a soUd basis of knowledge, it must
a
not
to
course to the machines we know about, our own, and
only
rather
universe of mechanisms which is after all a postulate or

man to
a working hypothesis of science. Of course comparison of
even the
a lawnmower or a gas engine is mere childishness: not
lowest organic creature can be closely compared with any such putNothing is more
together thing as these or any other machine.
it is not put together and cannot
mere parts, and cease to be what
not
are
organs
be
It would be more
organism.
the
from
separated
when
they are
universe
is more unlike
material
in
the
nothing
that
sensible to say

essential to organic life than that

taken apart.

a machine than

Its

is

an organism.

And

of

all

organisms

man

is

the

least machine-like.

turn to the mechanisms, so-called, of the physicist and
the biologist, we admit freely that man's body is apparently on the
same general plane with the bodies of all other living creatures, and

When we

is

subject to the

same general laws and

principles of operation as

one of the main lights that
Flatly man is an animal this
they.
which
his work made available
came from Darwin's work or rather
for the mass of thinking people. If an animal is a mechanism, then
:

in the

same

sense,

man

is

a mechanism:

is

but this

is

mechanism

in

a figurative, almost a poetic sense, far removed from the simple conlawnmower or eggbeater.

cept of the

3.

Is the

Here we meet again

World a Mechanism f

the easy conversion of a laboratory hy-

pothesis into a demonstrated proposition.

It is

surprising

how many

intelligent people just assume that the world is a vast mechanical
contraption, like Huxley's imaginary clock, all wound up and going
That the physico-chemical world
its inexorable fore-ordained way.
is just this is one of the commonest of assumptions; it is treated as
a basis of solid concrete upon which to build the most imposing

logical structures.
if

he

is

Not only

the mechanist but the anti-mechanist,

to share in the indispensable

boons of science, both practical

and speculative, must adopt the use of the hypothesis in enormous
ranges of his thinking. So this most admirable of intellectual devices tends ceaselessly to become the most subtle enemy of a full
It is a sort
philosophical grasp of the problem of the World-All.
of intellectual summa jus sumnia injuria.

IS
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Yet the mechanistic character of the universe is totally unit is at most a brilliantly successful working device and
an enticing and alluring speculation. Even in its genuine and true
role as working device, it seems to have flaws when pushed to
extreme and checked by the newest methods of precision and commethods so abstruse and complicated that only an expert
putation,
dare try to talk about them. How much havoc is the Heysenberg
principle of indetermination to work in the extreme refinements of
determinism? Will Millican's cosmic ray save the universe from
the antinomy of the law of entropy ?
Then there is the profound logical difficulty involved in the fact
that the so-called laws of science are always based on conditions
proven:

—

that never obtain in the concrete processes of the very nature they

purport to describe: the law of falling bodies

law accordlaw of motion
holds "except insofar as (the body) may be compelled by impressed
force to change that state ;" and it is evidence that the exception is
really the universal rule, so that the "law" is a useful tool of thought
is

really a

ing to which no actual body ever falls; Newton's

first

and computation but useless as description of nature in any form.
It is a wholesome discipline for the mechanistically inclined mind
to consider the case of a profound mathematician and physicist,
Charles Pearce, who sums up his universe under the title "Love,
Chance, and Logic," and insists that contingency is integral to the
world of nature; he even coins the name tychism for his theory of
Haldane, an expert in the stronghold of mechanism, bioreality.
chemistry,

—

—

flatly

declares that the mechanistic principle falls far

short of validity and efficacy.

Looked
still

at in the full light of present-day science the universe

refuses to submit tamely to the mechanistic shackles.

Clear

from
man, it eludes the logic of determinism and powerfully suggests
something far different. It is noteworthy that the physicist in a
struggle to portray the behavior of atoms is forced to use humanistic, even sentimental terms, and say that the atomic family is
electrons

satisfied or

and protons up through the hierarchy of being to

dissatisfied

according to the presence or lack of

appropriate assemblage of infinitesimal members.
traced to

its

furthest limits seems to consort with something not

mechanistic at

sentiment

is

its

Thus mechanism

all

:

logic refuses to decide

really prior; that

is

then

left

and on that preference the thinking world

whether mechanism or
to personal preference,
splits.

—
:
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It is

hard

to

avoid the feehng that the physics and biology of
in its larger implications and tendencies if

today would be sounder

they took a page from their humble predecessors,

— "natural philos-

We have come far from the time
when prevailing opinion agreed that "the undevout astronomer is
mad"; without wishing to go back and bolster up the theological
argument from the starry heavens, is it too much to wish that
modern science should look up occasionally from its engrossment
ophy" and "natural history."

"Slore attention to the gross facts

with microscopes and calculus?

of the world need not shut out any of the minutiae, and would be
likely to lessen the tendency toward mechanistic and deterministic
ipse dixits.

Let us turn natural philosophers or natural historians and look

—

movement and
of two things,
though
it had always
that
as
and
variety it is
all
frames into
But
largest
of
the
always
on.
go
gone on and would
evolution,^
frame
it,
the
of
which the mind of man has fitted
Two
is essentially a going from somewhere to somewhere else.
significant formulas must be reckoned with, each the fruit of a great
mind, creative evolution and emergent evolution whatever flaws
there may be in the particulars of the work of these two thinkers
the main thesis stands firm and that thesis in no wise encourages any
at the

cosmos

in the large.

It is full

eternally going on.

:

—

—

;

:

extreme mechanistic theory of
us the formulas the
to

Bergson

there

is

it

room

is

life,

sum
to

is

is

the two

men who gave

essentially non-mechanistic

Lloyd Morgan, it is spirit. In both cases
Chance and Logic," and that is

for Pearce's "Love,

more than can be said of
The logic inherent in
astronomer

To

reality.

of things

mad"

is

a purely mechanistic theory.
the once honored verse,

still

as

good as

it

lost its specifically theological direction

;

"The undevout

ever was, only that
it

still

it

has

points to elements

and components beyond the present scope of human understanding.
The vast swing of the infinite and the unwearied elusiveness of the
infinitesimal, and the endless play of variation, mutation, shades of
being, tmforeseen emergencies, the eternal

new

in the flux of time,

We have
all tend to throw doubt upon a mechanistic metaphysics.
more
either
side,
only
or
less
vague
indications
no coercive proof on
and suggestions, and these abundantly present on both sides we can
only conclude that categorical assertion on either side would be
dogmatic and presumptuous. In all this I refer to the so-called
;

IS

material or
himself,
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we must now

turn to

Man

ourselves.

To the question "What is man" the first and most authoritative
answer for each of us is "I am Man." I must follow the counsel of
Here is the source of
Socrates and Fichte and examine myself.
Vital as is the laboraall concepts and the significance of all terms.
my
own
essential
me
nothing
about
being which conit
can
tell
tory
experience
immediate
of
that
being.
Obnoxious
my
own
tradicts
really
logical
ears,
it
is
a
truism,
for
as this may sound to some
objective science when true to itself repudiates any contact with the
inner data here referred to the rigorous behaviorist would agree
logically, indeed extremely, for he would declare that those inner
data are nil and non-existent and that science has no concern with
such non-entity. In all of which he is right and wrong, as usual.
:

;

5.

What

Am

I?

am eternally the "base of all metaphysics" the Alpha
whether or not the Omega also is a distant question. Here
the mystics are sound and safe, and speculative thought today needs
myself,

I,

at least

;

;

nothing so

much

as to listen to their voice.

of the pure spirit without being drunken
test of the

metaphysician

:

if

I,

;

in

poetry Walt

Whitman

myself, to myself,

am

is

drink of the doctrine

perhaps the supreme

Emerson had written

of aphorisms he might have surpassed

ment

To

all

a system instead

the rest in this achieve-

has actually done

it.

donnees immediates de conscience."
of experience are absolute and indefeasible:
"less

These aboriginal gifts
toward them is mere perversity, a form of pseudoknowledge poised upon nothing thumbing its nose at both sound
philosophy and ordinary common sense.
What I am, see, hear,
feel, in any and every way experience,
all this is just what it is and
brooks no refutation, for the simple reason that nothing in the universe has any competence to refute it. These are Dewey's "being
and havings," prior to and determinative of all knowledge. To pragmatism they are indeed not knowledge at all but still they are more
certain than any knowledge.
It would be as valid terminology to
say that they are knowledge par excellence, except perhaps for the
advantage of saving the term knowledge for the great operative
region of language and reasoning which is built by life and speculation upon or out of the basic gifts of the experience of the Ego.
scepticism

—

;
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Yet

all this is

sadly out of fashion in these latter days, and not

So often philosif not thoroughly reasonable.
ophy has looked at the within and become enamored of it, and so
lapsed from the clear-cut processes demanded by speculation into
mere mystic adoration. And at the same time the physical sciences
have made such a grand success by ignoring and forgetting their
without cause even

own

mother-lode of primary personal experience, that the philosophers have run after them and so abandoned all hope of any
philosophy. One must admit that something more than nine-tenths

of

people would turn gladly from Fichte or Hegel or
Darwin and Huxley and Faraday and the host of their

all intelligent

Bradley

to

modern

followers.

Nevertheless, "though fiends and

brows of

grace, yet grace

must

still

all

things

look so

the Ego-philosophers have erred, the

Ego

still

is

should wear the

ill

no matter how badly

;"

the starting point

and thought: no matter where we want to go we must
from
where
we are: and where I am is in myself. So we may
start
as well brave the lifted eyebrows of the arbiters of intellectual
fashion, and proclaim the doctrine of the Self as "the beginning of
for both

life

wisdom"

in speculative thought.

William James discussing Kant's categories suddenly blurted out
in one of those inimitable sallies of his, "Of course we know we

have no such clanking machinery inside
natural utterance for the brilliant

us.

"What

mind which

first

could be a more
taught the world

and vividly of "the stream of thought?" His PrinPsychology" is full from beginning to end of the sort of
true description of the life of the Self which we are now seeking.

to think clearly

cipales of

Most vital of all is his insistence upon the totality and unity of the
primary form of experience
"After discrimination, association,"
is the formula.
His description of the infant's life as a "buzzing,
blooming confusion" may suffer from his fondness for the pic:

turesque, but

of experience

it

is

eloquent of his sense of the unity and continuity

at its start.

But the adult mind does not lose this primitive unity and conone might be tempted to suppose it does gain an ever

tinuity, as

;

increasing manifoldness and variegation;

whole world of details and
still bound up and integrated

Above

all

it

gradually acquires a

the infinite manifold is
an unbroken unity and coherence.

systenis, but
in

does experience refuse ever to reveal fragments, disjecta
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always fluency, totality, connectedalways a way to travel from any point in the whole
This is perto any other part with coherence at every transition.
sonality: or more strictly it is this experienced unity of one's own

membra,
ness

;

bits joined together;

there

is

experience, plus the postulate of other selves, that yields the concept

of personality as inhering in ourselves and other beings outwardly
similar to us.
It

finite

may

be noted in passing that this concept of a practically innumber of persons, each with its own world, no tw^o of the

worlds being supposably identical, is at the same time near-inconSolipsism if feasible at all would be a
ceivable and inescapable.
happy escape from such a gigantic demand upon the mind. But
of

all

sible,

many

the

solutions of the world-riddle that are logically pos-

but practically objectionable, solipsism

is

doubtless the most

hopelessly absurd.

Now

if

any two things

in the

whole range of our conception are

diametrically different, this "I" and a machine or

The machine

is

mechanism

are.

put together of parts, each part having an entity and

—
—

In the machine proper, the only
its own.
mechanism of which we have any competent knowledge, the parts
as every second-hand
exist prior to the machine and can survive it,
Ford dealer well knows. But in the "I," the whole exists first, and
possible existence of

—

—

we should have another name, such as phases or
moments, arise in and through the whole, never having any entity
of their own, either before, during, or after the whole.
The pattern of mechanism is one of discontinuity and incidental
contact and interaction the pattern of the I is fluent, coherent, and

the "parts,"

—

;

The

genetically rather than incidentally interacting.
sleep,

we know anything about
trast,

but increase

it,

death, not only do not mitigate this con-

for they are

all

processes totally be_\'ond the

range of behavior or machine or mechanism.
called living

tions

notable facts of

and other forms of unconsciousness and of death so far as

is

mechanisms

To

point out that so-

parallel these strange interludes or cessa-

again to bring into

relief the

gap between mechanism

in its

true sense and even the lower forms of non-mechanistic existence.

But,
total

it

may be
may

entity,

said, all this unity

and coherence,

be mere illusion, and

if

this fluenc}-

and

only seen clearly and

acutely enough, would turn out to be mechanism, with parts too
small to be perceived by our powers.

This

is

a very triumph of
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infantilism in intellectual high places:

it

is

of a piece with

"why

and whether pigs have wings." True, it can
be said with words and true also there is no coercive logic to oppose
to it all of which may be said of solipsism. The only bar to it is a
the sea

is

boiling hot
:

;

practical one, just as

primary experiences
able

form of

"All

Maya

is

reliable

is

if we suppose these
down comes every conceiv-

the case with solipsism:

to be illusion, then

knowledge: the mystic dictum

or illusion."

Solipsism

is 'far

is fulfilled

and

better than this doctrine

of illusion, for solipsism does give us a coherent and understandable

picture of a universe, and a simple and logically charming one, even

and abhorrent the doctrine of illusion
annihilates all firm and livable reality and plunges us logically into
a waste of mist and ignorance.
There are then two senses in which we may understand anyone
who declares that man is a mechanism first, that he is essentially like
one of his own machines, and this is so absurd that the mechanist
if it is

practically outrageous

;

:

it with all vigor.
Second, that man is like natural
mechanisms, and that necessarily in a figurative or symbolical sense,
and this is quite harmless and poetic, unless and until accompanied

himself repudiates

by adequate
istic

specifications.

proposition

in

the

In any case neither
least

degree

authentic sense of the fluent, coherent, unified

of

my own

existence.

Practically this

form of the mechanmy direct and
and purposive nature

invalidates

means

the continued function

of the moral life and of ethics as part of philosophy.

